Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: Victory
or Defeat?*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In November of 1993, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
decided Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 1 With this decision, the Court
promulgated a framework for analysis of "hostile environment" sexual
harassment claims, which arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.2 Although the Harris decision resolved an important split
among the circuits regarding the hostile environment sexual harassment
cause of action, important questions still remain regarding the significance and effect of the decision.
Title VII is the most important legislation designed to eliminate gender
based discrimination in employment. Using the broad reach of its
commerce power, Congress explicitly prohibited employers from
"discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 3 The
ideology upon which Title VII is based is that people must be evaluated
as individuals, rather than as members of a class.
The fulfillment of that philosophy· has been slow in coming in the
context of sexual harassment, a significant category of sex discrimination. Early cases treated sexual harassment of employees by employers
as outside the scope of Title VIl's protection. 4 However, since its
* I would like to thank Professor Lisa Foster for her suggestions regarding this
Casenote, as well for her insights regarding the law in general. Her exceptional
incisiveness, talent for communicating ideas, and generous spirit serve her very well as
a teacher of the law. Thank you for inspiring me to ask questions and for helping me
to learn.
1.
114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a){l) (1988). For a detailed explanation of the reach of
Title VII, see CLAIRE s. THOMAS, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN A NUTSHELL§ 15.03 (2d ed.
1991).
4.
Come v. Bausch & Lombe, Inc., 390 F. Supp 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
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adoption in 1964, the Supreme Court slowly, albeit steadily, broadened
the statute's reach. In 1978, the Court broadly interpreted Title VII's
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" to evince a
congressional intent "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women" in employment. 5 Accordingly, courts
soon recognized that sexual harassment constituted a major source of
disparate treatment of men and women in employment and that sexual
harassment affected an employee's conditions of employment.
Thus, the law came to recognize and proscribe two types of sexual
harassment under Title VIL The first type of sexual harassment, which
does not engender substantial controversy, is called quid pro quo sexual
harassment. This category of sexual harassment encompasses hiring,
continued employment, or promotion explicitly conditioned on sexual
favors. 6 The second type is hostile environment sexual harassment,
where the workplace is so tainted with unwelcome sexual conduct that
it affects the employee's ability to do her job. 7 It is this second type of
harassment which attracts criticism and debate because, unlike quid pro
quo harassment, it is often difficult to identify. Illegality of the conduct

5.
Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
Actually, legislative history regarding Congressional intent for the inclusion of sex as a
protected class is virtually nonexistent because sex was added to the list of protected
classes in a failed effort to defeat passage of Title VII:
Efforts to add sex as a protected class to earlier titles in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 were consistently defeated. The amendment adding sex was
introduced just two days before approval of Title VII by Representative
Howard Smith of Virginia. Smith had vigorously opposed passage of the Civil
Rights Act, and was accused by some of wishing to sabotage its passage by
proposing an amendment adding sex as a protected class, which the House had
previously and consistently rejected.
THOMAS, supra note 3, at 217. Thus, the noble intent credited to Congress by the
Supreme Court was not found in the legislative history of the statute.
6.
See, e.g., Hirschfield v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 575
(10th Cir. 1990) ("Quid pro quo sexual harassment involves the conditioning of tangible
employment benefits upon the submission to sexual conduct."); Hicks v. Gate Rubber
Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Quid pro quo harassment occurs when
submission to sexual conduct is made a condition of concrete employment benefits.");
Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992);
Kariban v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l
Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
7.
Female pronouns will be used generically throughout this Casenote to refer
to a harassed plaintiff. Although "she" is the chosen pronoun, females are not exclusive
victims of sexual harassment. Title VII protects both genders from discrimination
because of sex. However, the female generic has been chosen because the majority of
plaintiffs in hostile environment cases are women. In addition, the focus of much of this
Casenote is on the uniqueness of the female perception of sexual conduct, and the
potential effects of Harris on prospective female plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit.
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in question is inherently a matter of degree. Since the :first case
establishing hostile environment sexual harassment as a cause of action
in 1986,8 courts have struggled with defining the contours of this cause
of action. In a society permeated with sexual stereotypes and conditioned roles,9 the difficulty lies in distinguishing between "merely
offensive" 10 conduct and conduct that contravenes Title VII's guarantee
against sexual discrimination.
With its decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 11 the Court
created a framework for analysis of "hostile environment" 12 sexual
harassment cases. In one important respect, the Harris Court definitively
resolved a split of authority in the circuits by holding that no psychological harm to the plaintiff is required for a Title VII "hostile environment"
cause of action. 13 In addition, the Harris Court adopted subjective and
objective standards to determine whether the alleged conduct at issue
rose to the level of illegal sexual harassment. 14 Although the Harris
decision cleared up much of the previous ambiguity surrounding the
"hostile environment" sexual harassment cause of action, many important
questions still remain regarding the significance and effect of the
decision.
This Casenote will analyze the significance and potential effects of the
decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. Part II sets forth the
historical backdrop of this case while Part III summarizes the facts and
holdings in Harris. Part IV explores and compares the effect of the
Harris decision in general with the decision's effect in the Ninth Circuit

8.
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
9.
See generally FREDERICK WILLIAMS ET AL., CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND
SEX-ROLE STEREOTYPING (1981); LEAP. STEWART ET AL., COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
THE SEXES: SEX DIFFERENCES AND SEX-ROLE STEREOTYPES (1986).
10.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. at
67 ("[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term,
condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII."); Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (deciding "mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would not sufficiently
affect conditions of employment to violate Title VII), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
11.
114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
12.
"Hostile work environment" sexual harassment and "abusive work environment" sexual harassment are used interchangeably by the Supreme Court and are
presumably synonymous terms. See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 369, 372 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
13. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
14.
Id.
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in particular. Finally, this Casenote concludes that, although Harris
allows more women to bring hostile environment cases in many
jurisdictions, it potentially reduces their chances of winning in the Ninth
Circuit. Thus, this Casenote will recommend an interpretation of Harris
which universally furthers the purposes of Title VII.
II.

BACKGROUND TO HARRIS

Prior to 1976, lower courts had completely rejected sexual harassment
claims as outside the scope of Title VII because such harassment was a
manifestation of the "personal proclivity" or "personal urge" of the
harasser rather than a form of sex discrimination. 15 In subsequent
cases, recovery was allowed only where the plaintiff proved that the
harassment was intentional and that she suffered some tangible financial
loss, such as non-promotion or discharge. 16
In the 1986 landmark case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,1 7 the
Supreme Court unanimously established a cause of action for sexual
harassment which creates a "hostile or abusive work environment." 18

15. Corne v. Bausch & Lombe, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975); see
also Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976). As the
Tomkins court reasoned:
Title VII was enacted in order to remove those artificial barriers to full
employment which are based upon unjust and long-encrusted prejudice. Its
aim is to make careers open to talents irrespective of race or sex. It is not
intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to a physical attack
motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened to
occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley.
Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556.
16. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 409 F. Supp. 1083
(N.D. Tex. 1976); Munford v. Barnes, 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Heelan v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D: Colo. 1978); Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518
F. Supp. 1309 (D. N.D. 1981); Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp.
1149 (M.D. Pa. 1982); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979); Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for
the Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV..
1007 (1978).
17. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
18. Id. at 66. The first case which recognized a cause of action based on a
discriminatory work environment was Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). In Rogers, the discrimination was not gender based;
rather, the discrimination was racially motivated. The court held that a Hispanic
employee could establish a Title VII violation by showing that her employer created "a
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." Id. at 238.
In Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982), the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals applied the Rogers interpretation of Title VII in a sexual harassment context.
The court said:
.
[The harassment] must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions
of employment and create an abusive working environment. Whether sexual
harassment at the workplace is sufficiently severe and persistent to affect
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Under this cause of action, there is no requirement of financial injury to
the claimant as a result of the discrimination. 19 However, the Court
noted that "not all workplace conduct that may be described as
'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment
within the meaning of Title VII . . . . For sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment. "'2° Furthermore, "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome. "'21
An employee's voluntary acquiescence to sex-related conduct is not a
defense when the employee fears dismissal if she does not comply.
Hence, a prima facie claim of hostile environment sexual harassment
requires a complaint of unwelcome sexual advancements which are
severe or pervasive.
The circuits disagreed as to the interpretation of the newly enunciated
"severe or pervasive" standard. The Sixth Circuit held that conduct was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile working environment unless "the charged sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's work performance and creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that affected
seriously the psychological well-being of the plaintiff."22 Therefore, in
order for a plaintiff have prevailed in a hostile environment sexual
harassment case in the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff had to prove that the
offending conduct in question was so severe or pervasive that it inflicted

seriously the psychological well being of employees is a question to be
determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 904. The Supreme Court later cited Henson with approval in Meritor. Meritor,
477 U.S. at 66-67.
19. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
20. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
21. Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1985)).
22. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 1986); see also
Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., .863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1989) (requiring
plaintiff in Title VII racial discrimination case to show severe emotional harm to satisfy
pervasiveness standard); Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir.
1982) (deciding plaintiff in a racial discrimination case can establish a violation of Title
VII by showing that the work environment is "so heavily polluted with discrimination
as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers" (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972))); Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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serious psychological harm on her. Although this approach created a
possibly efficient bright-line rule, it forced the victim of workplace abuse
to patiently endure outrageous conditions without relief unless and until
she suffered a mental collapse.23 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit held
that "when judging the totality of the circumstances impacting upon the
asserted abusive and hostile environment ... , [the trier of fact] must
adopt the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar
environment under essentially like or similar circumstances."24 The
gender neutral standard was adopted "[t]o accord appropriate protection
to both plaintiffs and defendants in a hostile and/or abusive work
environment ...." 25 In other words, the harassing conduct in question
must have been objectively severe and pervasive from the perspective of
both a reasonable victim (usually female) and from the perspective of the
reasonable person engaged in the allegedly harassing conduct (usually
male).
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit's serious psychological
damage standard and promulgated an entirely different approach in
Ellison v. Brady. 26 The court reasoned that a woman should not have
to suffer severe psychological harm before she can bring a Title VII
hostile environment action. Rather, the court reasoned, the law should
step in precisely to prevent such harm. 27 "It is the harasser's conduct
which must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration in the conditions
of employment."28 Thus, the court held that the hostile environment
cause of action was actionable without a showing of psychological harm
to the plaintiff.

23. For example, in Rabidue, in which the court held the defendant's conduct did
not create a hostile environment, the workplace contained posters of naked women, and
one of the defendant's male employees "routinely referred to women as 'whores,' 'cunt,'
'pussy' and 'tits."' Rabidue v. Osceola Re£ Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Keith, J., concurring and dissenting). Furthermore, the employee "specifically remarked
'All that bitch needs is a good lay' and called her 'fat ass."' Id. However, without a
showing of psychological harm, the female plaintiff was not legally entitled to relief
from such persistent abuse in the workplace, which spanned plaintiff's seven years of
employment. Id. at 622. This illustrates the dilemma a harm requirement places on
prospective plaintiffs in hostile environment cases: they must either quit their jobs to
avoid the abuse (and thus suffer the burden) or endure an abusive workplace until they
suffer a nervous breakdown.
24. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
25. Id.
26.
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
27. Id. at 878; see Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 294
(E.D. Pa. 1991); Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992); Canada v. Boyd
Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771, 776 (D. Nev. 1992). For a case in which this rationale
was followed in the context of race discrimination, see Harris v. International Paper Co.,
765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Me. 1991).
28. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
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In addition, the Ellison court held that the conduct in question should
be viewed from the perspective of the victim to determine whether it
constituted a violation of Title VIl. 29 Thus, "a female plaintiff states
a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she
alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment. "30 The court reasoned that "because
women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women
have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior."31
Furthermore, "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be malebiased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women."32
The court cautioned that "[t]he reasonable woman standard does not
establish a higher level of protection for women than men. Instead, a
gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to
participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men. "33
As the Ellison court recognized, women have a unique wariness of
threatening sexual conduct because they are more vulnerable than men
to becoming victims of sex crimes:
Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual
assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual
conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the
underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive. 34

29. Id.; see also Bums v. McGregor Blee. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir.
1993) ("We must view the harrassment from the victim's perspective, and in this case
the victim is a woman."); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D.
Me. 1991); Carrillo v. Ward, 770 F. Supp. 815, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Smolsky v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
30. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
31.
Id.
32. Id. "If we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in
allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of
discrimination. Harassers could continue to harass merely because a particular
discriminatory practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no remedy." Id. at 878.
33. Id. at 879 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the reasonable woman standard
evinces the average female perception of sexually offensive conduct in the workplace,
and not the "idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee." Id.
34. Id.; see Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[M]en
and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior.");
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1203 (1989) (explaining that the "characteristically 'male'
view" of sexual harassment is that it is mere entertainment and harmless); Nancy S.
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Thus, a woman's nagging concern for safety may lead her to perceive
sexual conduct as harassment, even when a male harasser does not
realize that his conduct creates a hostile working environment. A
"gender neutral" standard fails to capture this particular female
perspective.
ill.

HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC.

In 1993, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harris to resolve
expressly the "conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be
actionable as 'abusive work environment' harassment. ..must 'seriously
affect [an employee's] psychological well-being' or lead the plaintiff to
'suffe[r] injury. "'35 Plaintiff Teresa Harris worked as a manager at an
equipment rental company called Forklift Systems, Inc. from April 1985
to October 1987. Charles Hardy was Forklift's president. Throughout
the time that Harris worked for Forklift, Hardy "often insulted her
because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual
innuendos."36 For instance, the Magistrate found that in the presence
of other employees, Hardy had called Harris a "'dumb ass woman. "'37
Hardy had similarly commented to Harris, "'You're a woman, what do
you know, "'38 and "'We need a man as the rental manager. "'39 Also
in "front of others, he suggested that the two of them 'go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise."'40 In addition, "Hardy occasionally
asked Harris and other female employees to get coins from his front
pants pocket. He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and
other women, and asked them to pick the objects up. He made sexual
innuendos about Harris' and other women's clothing."41
After Harris complained to Hardy in August 1987 about his behavior,
Hardy claimed he was only joking,.apologized, and promised he would
stop. Harris remained an employee based on the assurance that Hardy
would cease such offensive conduct. However, in early September,

Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1207-08 (1990) (noting that men often
view some harassing conduct as "harmless social interactions to which only overlysensitive women would object.").
35.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 370 (quoting writ of certiorari, 113
S. Ct. 1382 (1993)) (alterations in original).
36. Id. at 369.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
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while Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's customers,
Hardy commented in front of other employees, "What did you do,
promise the guy. . .some [sex] Saturday night?"42 Then, on October 1,
Harris "collected her paycheck and quit."43
Harris then commenced suit against Forklift, claiming that Hardy's
harassing conduct constituted abusive work environment sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII. The United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee found this to be a "close case,"44
yet held that although some of Hardy's comments "would [have]
offend[ed] the reasonable woman,"45 they were not "so severe as to be
expected to seriously affect [Harris'] psychological well being. A
reasonable woman manager under like circumstances would have been
offended by Hardy, but his conduct would not have risen to the level of
interfering with that person's work performance.''46 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished
opinion. 47
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
circuits as to whether proof of severe psychological harm is a prerequisite to establish a viable Title VII action. 48 First, the Court
reaffirmed the "severe or pervasive" standard established in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson. 49 "When the workplace is permeated with
'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' ...that is 'sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment,' ... Title VII is violated."50
Under this standard, conduct which is "merely offensive,"51 such as the
"'mere utterance ... of an... epithet which engenders offensive feelings
in a [sic] employee'" is beyond the reach of Title VII. 52 On the other
hand, "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 370.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992)).
48. Id. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of a unanimous court. Id. at 369.
49. 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
50. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
65, 67 (1986)).
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
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a nervous breakdown."53 Thus, the Court held that "[s]o long as the
environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious."54
From the holding in Harris, one is able to construct the basic
framework for future analysis of hostile environment sexual harassment
cases. First, the Court created a two-pronged standard to determine
whether the conduct in question created a hostile or abusive working
environment-an objective prong, and a subjective prong.55 As a
preliminary matter, a court would ask whether a reasonable person
would objectively think the offensive conduct created a hostile environment. Next, a court would ask whether the person bringing the action
subjectively found the environment hostile or abusive, regardless of the
reasonableness of the claimant's perception. A court would consider
whether the plaintiff found the offensive conduct "unwelcome." Second,
as long as an objective person would have found the environment
abusive, and the plaintiff found it so, the plaintiff would not need to
show that she suffered any psychological harm. 56
Furthermore, the Court noted that it would be impossible to construct
a "mathematically precise test" 57 to determine whether an environment
is "hostile" or "abusive." This factual determination can be made "only
by looking at all the circumstances."58 Therefore, the Court offered
some relevant factors for determining whether conduct constitutes hostile
environment sexual harassment:
These [factors] may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance. The effect of the employee's psychological well-being is, of
course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the
environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant
factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. 59

Because the Court found that the district court had reached its judgment
for Forklift "only after finding that [Forklift's] conduct was not 'so
severe as to be expected to seriously affect plaintiff's psychological wellbeing' ... and that Harris was not 'subjectively so offended that she

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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Id.
Id. at 371 (citation omitted).
Id. at 370-71.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id.
Id.
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suffered injury,'"60 the judgment was reversed and the case was
remanded for proceedings consistent with the Court's new standard.

IV.
A.

EFFECT OF HARRIS

Psychological Harm

As most commentators agree, the Harris decision significantly
heightens nationwide harassment protection in the workplace. 61 By
dispensing with a requirement of psychological harm, Harris unquestionably expands actionability, and arguably recovery, in hostile environment
cases in general. 62 After Harris, although a showing of harm is
certainly probative evidence that the work environment was indeed
hostile, a plaintiff need not present such evidence to assert her claim.
Therefore, the abandonment of the harm requirement avails the claim to
plaintiffs who previously would have been unable to make a prima facie
case in many jurisdictions. In addition, the decision will most likely

60.
Id.
61.
See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Plaintiff's Lawyers Applaud Decision, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1993, at A22; Jorge Aquino, Both Sides Applaud Justices' Ruling on Sexual
Harassment; Opinion Unlikely To Change State Law Here, However, RECORDER, Nov.
10, 1993, at 1; Richard Carelli, Harassment Protection Bolstered; Damages OK Without
Harm, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 10, 1993, at 1; Joan Biskupic, Sexual Harassment
Protections Bolstered; Unanimous High Gourt Rules Plaintiff Need Not Prove
Psychological Injury, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1993, at Al; Daniel Wise, "Harm"
Criteria Out in Harassment Suits, 210 N.Y. L.J. 92, Nov. 10, 1993, at 1; Ana Puga,
Justices Ease Proof of Sexual Harassing; Case Needn't Show Psychological Hurt,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 1993, at 1; A Legal Victory Against Workplace Harassers,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at B4; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court; Justices
Make It Easier to Win Sex Harassment Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, § 4, at 2;
Supreme Court Expands Recovery for Sexual Harassment, LIABILITY WK., Nov. 15,
1993, No. 44, Vol. 8; Ruth Walker, Fresh Air From High Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 17, 1993, at 22.
62.
Although the issue is beyond the scope of this Casenote, it is interesting to
note that one commentator, Kingsley R. Browne, argues that Title VII, and the
interpretation of it in Harris, violates the First Amendment For commentary on this
argument, see Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment and
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Kingsley R. Browne, Muzzling
Sexually Hostile Speech, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 22, 1993, at 26; Kingsley R. Browne, A
Silenced Workplace, RECORDER, Nov. 24, 1993, at 8; Kingsley R. Browne, Stifling
Sexually Hostile Speech, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 29, 1993, at 19. Kingsley R. Browne is
an associate professor of law at Wayne State University Law School in Detroit,
specializing in employment discrimination.
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expand recovery because plaintiffs will have less to prove. 63 The
Court's retreat from the psychological harm requirement secures a
uniform and humane approach to sexual harassment in every jurisdiction.
Therefore, Harris constitutes a resounding national victory.
However, the Court's rejection of the psychological harm requirement
will have no practical effect in the Ninth Circuit and jurisdictions which
followed the Ninth Circuit's lead. By the time of the Harris decision,
the Ninth Circuit had already dispensed with the psychological harm
standard in 1991 in Ellison v. Brady,64 finding it contrary to the
rationale of Title VII. 65 Although the Supreme Court's holding is a
step forward in many jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit had already taken
that important step. Therefore, the abandonment of a psychological
harm requirement is of no practical significance in many jurisdictions,66
such as the Ninth Circuit.
However, the Harris Court's sustainment of the reasonable person
standard (as opposed to a reasonable woman standard) could have an
effect in the Ninth Circuit. In addition to abandoning the harm
requirement, the Ninth Circuit in Ellison had adopted the reasonable
woman standard in place of the traditional, "male-biased,"67 reasonable
person standard. 68 This gender specific standard not only enables more
women to bring claims, it enables more women to win. What is the
effect of Harris on the Ninth Circuit's gender conscious approach? Even
though Harris lowers the floor of actionability of hostile environment
claims nationally by abandoning the psychological harm requirement,
does it simultaneously lower the ceiling of victory in the Ninth Circuit
by adopting the reasonable person standard?

B.

Subjective Standard

The Harris Court promulgated a hostile environment standard, under
which the plaintiff subjectively must have found the environment hostile

63. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court: Justices Make it Easier to Win Sex
Harassment Suits, supra note 61, at 2; Supreme Court Expands Recovery for Sexual
Harassment, supra note 61.
64.
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 879. For a discussion of Ellison, see supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 29.
67. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
68.
Of course, where a male plaintiff alleges that co-workers engaged in conduct
that created a hostile working environment, the appropriate victim's perspective would
be the "reasonable man" perspective. Id. at 879 n.11; see also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987).
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and the working environment must have been objectively hostile. 69 At
first glance, the subjective prong might appear inconsequential in
practical effect. Presumably, a plaintiff would not have brought a hostile
environment action unless she indeed perceived that unwelcome
offensive· conduct had rendered her workplace hostile. However, the
subjective prong is significant because it could provide a defendant with
a defense even if his conduct was objectively unreasonable. A defendant
could argue that although his conduct might have been objectively
unreasonable, the plaintiff welcomed the conduct. In that case, a hostile
environment claim would fail. Accordingly, the subjective prong could
enable a defendant to shift the focus from his unreasonable conduct to
the plaintiff. A defendant might attempt to assassinate a plaintiffs
character or suggestive wardrobe in an effort to prove that the plaintiff
welcomed the defendant's conduct. 70 However, the Court may have
intended that the subjective prong merely provide a safeguard against
frivolous or malicious claims. Depending on whether _courts view the
subjective .standard as a narrow safeguard or as an expansive defense, the
requirement could substantially effect the outcome of hostile environment actions. However, the discussion of this Casenote focuses on the
objectively hostile prong enunciated in Harris and its affect in the Ninth
Circuit.
C.

Objectively Hostile Standard

The Court's adoption of an objective "reasonable person standard,"
as it pertains to the objectively hostile prong, is of potentially dramatic
consequence. Does this language implicitly abrogate the reasonable
woman standard adopted in the Ninth Circuit, or could the gender
neutral language leave the reasonable woman standard intact?
The Harris decision has three possible interpretations. First, Harris
could be interpreted as an implicit rejection of the gender specific
approach. The Supreme Court was fully aware of the Ninth Circuit's
reasonable woman approach because the Court cited Ellison v. Brady,
the source of the gender specific approach. 71 Furthermore, the district
69. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
70. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (holding that
evidence of a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is relevant to
determining whether he or she found sexual advances unwelcome).
71. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
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court in the same case had used a gender specific standard when it noted
that some of Hardy's comments "would [have] offend[ed] the reasonable
woman,"72 and that a "reasonable woman manager under like circumstances would have been offended by Hardy."73 Nevertheless, the
Harris opinion conspicuously fails to mention or even vaguely to refer
to the gender specific approach. Arguably, this silence signifies that the
Court implicitly rejected the reasonable woman standard and replaced it
with a uniform reasonable person standard.
Assuming that Harris implicitly rejects the reasonable woman
standard, some commentators have argued that the gender of the victim
would still influence the fact-finder's assessment of the facts, even when
instructed on the reasonable person standard. As the National Women's
Law Center (NWLC) urges, "[T]he use of the term 'reasonable person'
does not in any way diminish the need to evaluate reasonableness from
the perspective of a person in the same or similar circumstances as the
alleged victim, including consideration of the alleged victim's gender."74 The NWLC "discourage[s] courts and litigants from reading
unintended significance into the choice of the term reasonable person."75 According to this argument, the "reasonable person standard
[does not authorize] ... judges, jurors or other fact-finders to substitute
their own reactions to the conduct and their beliefs about what they
would have done in that situation for the reactions of, a reasonable
person in the same or similar circumstances as the victim."76 Rather,
the reasonable person standard requires the fact finder to put him or
herself in the victim's place to consider the totality of the circumstances.
Thus, according to the NWLC, the "reasonable person" language the
Court used would still allow the fact finder to view the facts from the
unique perspective of the complainant, taking the gender of the
complainant into consideration. Therefore, although courts perhaps

72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id. (emphasis added). In fact, the district court appears to have been departing
from its circuit's precedent by using the reasonable woman standard. See Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
74.
DAILY LAB. REP., Jan. 13, 1994, at 9 (quoting comments by the National
Women's Law Center regarding the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
proposed guidelines on harassment based on race, color, religion, gender, national origin,
age, or disability). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.)
proposed guidelines aggregate, make consistent, and expound upon the definitions of
harassment under various anti-discrimination statutes. Id. These proposed guidelines
were published in the Federal Register one month prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Harris on October 1, 1993. Id. In response, various groups, including the National
Women's Law Center, commented upon the guidelines in general and in light of Harris.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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would be barred from using a reasonable woman standard per se, the
goal of the approach (recognition of the unique female perspective of
certain sexual conduct) would still be furthered through ·a gender
conscious interpretation of an express reasonable person standard.
However, the very use of the "reasonable person" language fails to
sufficiently emphasize the central role of gender in sexual harassment
claims. 77 The gender of the complainant would only sneak into the fact
:finder's mental reasoning process as but one of many circumstantial
factors. Although such an approach is, of course, preferable to a
completely gender-neutral one, it ignores the rationale upon which the
reasonable woman standard relies: that a female's perception of sexual
conduct may differ from a male's perspective because women are
uniquely vulnerable to sexual attack. 78 Even if jurors could find a way
to imprecisely consider gender as a relevant factor, such reasoning would
inevitably lack the potency of an express, judicially sanctioned
"reasonable woman" instruction. 79

77. Same-sex hostile environment claims are actionable and do indeed exist. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that female
supervisor's practice of laughing at female inferiors, making vulgar comments, and
encouraging another male supervisor's harassing conduct, constituted sexual harassment
of female employees). However, the vast majority of hostile environment claims, and
sex discrimination claims in general, are filed by women against men. For example,
over 40% of female federal employees reported incidents of sexual harassment involving
males in 1987. 1988 U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION Bo., REPORT ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 11.
78. As one commentator explains:
While many women hold positive attitudes about uncoerced sex, their greater
physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion can make women wary of
sexual encounters. Moreover, American women have been raised in a society
where rape and sex-related violence have reached unprecedented levels, and
a vast pornography industry creates continuous images of sexual coercion,
objectification and violence. Finally, women as a group tend to hold more
restrictive views of both the situation and type of relationship in which sexual
conduct is appropriate. Because of the inequality and coercion with which it
is so frequently associated in the minds of women, the appearance of sexuality
in an unexpected context or a setting of ostensible equality can be an
anguishing experience.
Abrams, supra note 34, at 1205.
79.
Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to allow plaintiffs the option of a jury
trial. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1992)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. IV 1992)). Even so, many Title
VII actions are tried by a judge. However, a reasonable woman standard would be
equally potent to a judge as to a jury.
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Second, as an alternative to the first interpretation, one could interpret
Harris such that the reasonable woman standard survived the decision
completely. If the Court meant to reject the reasonable woman
approach, why not do so explicitly? A mere sentence would have
sufficed to reject the reasonable woman standard unequivocally, yet the
opinion makes no reference to the reasonable woman standard at all.
Just as the Court's presumed knowledge of the reasonable woman
approach arguably supports an implied rejection of it, it is equally
probable that the very same silence constitutes implied approval.
The most plausible interpretation of this silence is that the Court
purposefully left the question open for another day. The district court
ruled in favor of the defendant on the grounds that Hardy's comments
"were not 'so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris']
psychological well~being."'80
In addition, according to its own
formulation_ of the issue, the Supreme Court "granted certiorari ...to
resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be
actionable as 'abusive work environment' harassment. ..must 'seriously
affect [an employee's] psychological well being' or lead the plaintiff to
'suffe[r] injury.'"81 Thus, the prompting issue for review was whether
a plaintiff must sustain psychological harm as a result of the defendant's
harassment. The Harris Court found that, because the district court had
reached its judgment for Forklift "only after finding that [Forklift's]
conduct was not 'so severe as to be expected to seriously affect
plaintiff's psychological well-being' ... and that Harris was not 'subjectively so offended that she suffered injury,"'82 the case needed to be
remanded for proceedings consistent with the abandonment of a harm
requirement. Arguably, the resolution of the case turned solely on
whether the plaintiff had to show that the defendant's conduct caused her
psychological harm. Hence, the rejection of a harm requirement was the
Harris Court's only binding holding. Under this literal reading of the
case, the "reasonable person" language is dicta. Therefore, because the
Court did not explicitly rule on the issue and never actually rejected the
reasonable woman standard, the gender conscious approach remains
viable. 83

80. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (alteration in original).
81. Id. (alterations in original).
82. Id. at 371.
83. The District Court for the Northern District of New York interpreted Harris
to leave open the question whether the reasonable woman standard applies in hostile
environment cases. See Currie v. Kowalewski, 842 F. Supp. 57, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Although the Harris case did not explicitly decide whether a reasonable person or
reasonable woman (or victim) standard applies, certainly any reasonable woman or
person would have found the defendant's behavior to be offensive and repulsive.").
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This interpretation gains support when one considers the unanimity of
the Harris decision. Did all the justices agree in the decision because
proper resolution of the issue was so indisputable that it pierced through
political and jurisprudential differences? If one examines the concurrences in Harris, the justices do not appear to equally support the
expansion of Title VII. Justice Scalia's concurrence reflects a wariness
that the Harris decision could open the floodgates on hostile environment claims. 84 On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
reflects staunch support for even greater protection for women against
sex discrimination. 85 Perhaps Justice Ginsburg and the more liberal

84. Justice Scalia expressed concern that
[a]s a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide
whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is
egregious enough to warrant an award of damages. One might say that what
constitutes "negligence" (a traditional jury question) is not much more clear
and certain than what constitutes "abusiveness." Perhaps so. But the class of
plaintiffs seeking to recover for negligence is limited to those who have
suffered harm, whereas under this statute "abusiveness" is to be the test of
whether legal harm has been suffered, opening more expansive vistas of
litigation.
Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg first characterized the majority's opinion
as a reaffirmance of the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, which created the
hostile environment cause of action under Title VIL Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Next, Justice Ginsburg explained how the Court's holding
dispensed with a psychological harm requirement:
The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed .... [T]he adjudicator's inquiry
should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs work performance. To show such
interference, ... [i]t suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the
discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so
altered working conditions as to "ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job."
Id. (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)). Thus,
Justice Ginsburg de-emphasized the "reasonable person" language in the majority
opinion. Instead, Justice Ginsburg narrowly emphasized Harris' reaffirmation of Meritor
and its abandonment of a psychological harm requirement. Next, Justice Ginsburg
appeared to lay the foundation of a future agenda by placing sex discrimination on an
equal footing with racial discrimination: "Davis concerned race-based discrimination,
but that difference does not alter the analysis; . . . Title VII declares discriminatory
practices based on race, gender, religion, or national origin equally unlawful." Id. at
372-73.
In a footnote, Justice Ginsburg discussed the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
This footnote possibly reveals Justice Ginsburg's interpretation of Harris: "Indeed, even
under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence. . .it remains an open question whether
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members of the Court joined in the opinion because it abandons the
psychological harm requirement. These members might patiently foresee
advancement one step at a time. Thus, one could comfortably join in
Harris today and wait to take the next step toward a gender specific
standard another day. In this scenario, needless debate over the
reasonable woman standard would only sabotage the issue at hand.
Conversely, Justice Scalia and other conservative members of the Court
might have joined in the decision because it takes a concededly
necessary step to further Congress' intent behind Title VII; however, the
decision comfortably goes no further.
Third, even if the "reasonable person" standard promulgated by the
Harris Court constitutes binding law, courts could still opt to use the
reasonable woman standard. Under this approach to Harris, the
objective reasonable person standard establishes a protective floor in
hostile environment cases, but it does not establish a ceiling. In other
words, a court would not be precluded from providing a plaintiff with
even greater protection than the decision requires. Harris only requires
that "the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived,
as hostile or abusive."86 Thus, at a bare minimum, a court must find
the conduct in question objectively and subjectively unreasonable to find
that it created a hostile environment. However, nothing in Harris
precludes a court from adhering to a reasonableness formulation that
affords plaintiffs heightened protection against sexual harassment. Such
an approach would be consistent with Harris, even though it affords
plaintiffs greater protection against sexual harassment than that provided
in Harris itself.

'classifications based on gender are inherently suspect."' Id. at 373 n.* (citing
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). Following the
footnote, Justice Ginsburg wrote, "The Court's opinion, which I join, seems to me in
harmony with the view expressed in this concurring statement." Id. at 373. Thus,
according to Justice Ginsburg, "it remains an open question" whether women are a
suspect class for equal protection purposes. Id. at 373 n.*. However, in Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Supreme Court held that women are a quasi-suspect class.
Although classifications burdening gender merit intermediate scrutiny for equal
protection purposes, such classifications do not receive strict scrutiny. However, under
Justice Ginsburg's interpretation, the question remains open because Craig sets a
protective floor without creating a ceiling.
Justice Ginsburg's equal protection approach could extend easily to Title VII analysis.
Accordingly, unless the Court explicitly creates a ceiling on Title VII protection, the
question remains open. Therefore, the reasonable woman standard remains viable after
Harris. Using Ginsburg's equal protection reasoning, just as women deserve heightened
protection against sex discrimination under the federal constitution, they should also
deserve heightened protection against sex discrimination under a federal statute which
safeguards the same interest.
86. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
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An express reasonable woman standard substantially furthers the
important goals of Title VIL Title VII was enacted to put women on
equal footing with men in the workplace. "Congress did not enact Title
VII to codify prevailing sexist prejudices. To the contrary, 'Congress
designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense
of degradation which serve to close or discourage employment opportunities for women. "'87 Clearly, although discrimination of either sex is,
of course, contrary to the mandate of Title VII, the statute was
indisputably enacted for the protection of women in the workplace. "It
must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the
struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female workers of
America."88 Contrary to this objective, the reasonable person standard
"tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the
experiences of women."89 As Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit commented in a dissent:
[I do not agree] that a court considering hostile environment claims should
adopt the perspective of the reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment . . . . In my view, the reasonable person perspective fails to account for
the wide divergence between most women's views of the appropriate sexual
conduct and those of men .... I would have courts adopt the perspective of the
reasonable victim which simultaneously allows courts to consider. salient
sociological differences as well as shield employers from the neurotic
complainant. 90

Because the reasonable woman standard emphasizes the unique female
perception of harassing conduct, it offers greater protection for women
than a reasonable person standard. '.J'hus, it would be consistent with
Harris for district courts and circuit courts to choose to offer more
protection to Title VII complainants by using the reasonable woman
standard rather than the reasonable person standard enunciated in the
Court's decision. In this way, Harris constitutes a threshold under which

87. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Andrews v. City
of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990)).
88. Rabidue v. Osceola Re£ Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986).
89. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
90. Rabidue, 805 F.2d · at 626 (Keith, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding that county agency did
not violate Title VII by taking female employee's sex into account and promoting her
over male employee with higher test score because the promotion decision was made in
an effort to remedy the underrepresentation of women and minorities in traditionally
male jobs, a policy which furthers Title VII).
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courts may not venture, but neither should the decision debilitate courts
from furthering Title VIl's guarantee to women against harassment in the
workplace. Therefore, courts may opt to use the reasonable woman
standard without affronting the Harris decision.
In sum, there are many possible interpretations of the "reasonable
person" standard enunciated in Harris. First, one could argue that the
language is an implicit rejection of the reasonable woman standard
followed in the Ninth Circuit. Following this interpretation, the factfinder would weigh all the relevant factors of the allegedly hostile
environment from the perspective of the reasonable person similarly
situated; in that case, gender would be a relevant factor. On the other
hand, perhaps the Harris Court remained silent regarding the reasonable
woman standard because it left the question open. Finally, the
reasonable person approach could have established a protective floor
without limiting the protections that a court may opt to afford its
complainants in Title VII actions. Under this interpretation, because the
reasonable woman standard offers women heightened protection in
hostile environment cases, courts could still opt to utilize the gender
specific approach consistent with Harris.

V.

CONCLUSION

This Casenote has argued that the reasonable woman standard survived
the recent Supreme Court decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
When the Supreme Court unanimously decided Harris in 1993, the
Court definitively rejected a psychological harm requirement for hostile
environment claims. In jurisdictions that had previously required the
plaintiff to prove that severe psychological harm resulted from the
defendant's abusive conduct, the Court's holding clearly expanded the
actionability of hostile environment claims, and it might have expanded
recovery as well. The Harris decision put the national level of Title
VII's protection against sexual harassment on a par with the Ninth
Circuit, which had already rejected a harm requirement in 1991.
Therefore, the Harris decision was a clear victory for sexual harassment
complainants across the nation.
The Court also decided that the offensive conduct should be viewed
from the perspective of a reasonable person to determine whether the
conduct amounted to sexual harassment. It would be unjust not to give
the Harris decision a construction which would enable it to cure the evil
targeted by Title VII and to accomplish the purpose for which it was
enacted. An interpretation of Harris that expands actionability and
recovery for sexual harassment in all jurisdictions is the interpretation
most consistent with the purpose of Title VIL Because a gender
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conscious standard substantially furthers the important goals of Title VII,
courts should retain the option of availing complainants of this potent
weapon of recovery.
· A different interpretation would render the decision internally
inconsistent. If Harris were to abolish completely the reasonable woman
standard, the decision would result in a giant step backward in the Ninth
Circuit for the goals of Title VIL Clearly, the Court intended Harris to
expand the actionability of hostile environment claims across the nation.
Arguably, the Court also intended to expand recovery in hostile
environment claims as well. At any rate, the Court obviously meant to
provide a national expansion of the hostile environment cause of action.
The Court's intent would be frustrated if, in a substantial number of
jurisdictions, plaintiffs were stripped of the most effective means of
recovery in hostile environment actions as a result of Harris. If the
reasonable woman standard were no longer an option for courts, Harris
would inconsistently be a relative victory for women nationally, but a
loss for women in the Ninth Circuit and many jurisdictions.91 Instead,
Harris should be interpreted to leave the reasonable woman standard
intact, in order to best effectuate the purposes of Title VII.
"[U]nless the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the
defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained
notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case,
men. " 92 Thus, courts should use the reasonable woman standard in
. hostile environment cases.
LAURA HOFFMAN ROPPE

91.

See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
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